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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOEL SCOTT McNEARNEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20090463-CA

:

SUMMARY
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied Mr. McNearney the
right to argue the State had failed to prove an element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, the trial court denied Mr.
McNearney the right to argue to the jury that the vacant uninhabited structure he entered
was not a "dwelling" as that element is defined under Utah law and therefore was guilty
of the lesser offense of burglary of a building, a third degree felony. When the issue went
to the jury, the question of whether Mr. McNearney entered a "dwelling" was a question
of fact, as are all elements of an offense, for the jury's determination. Where there was
evidence presented to support Mr. McNearney's theory of the case, he was entitled not
only to argue the State failed to establish the element of the offense but to have the jury
instructed on the lesser included offense of burglary of a building.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN DENYING MCNEARNEY THE
RIGHT TO ARGUE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE AND HAVE THE JURY INSTRUCTED
ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PREJUDICIAL.
Mr. McNearney was entitled to argue to the jury that the State had failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary element that the offense was "committed in a
dwelling" because the structure at issue—a newly built vacant house that had never been
occupied—did not fit within the statutory definition of "dwelling." It is well settled that
every fact necessary to prove an element of an offense must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to the finder of fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2008); United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("The Constitution gives a criminal
defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of
every element of the crime with which he is charged."); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 58990, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine
the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is weak or strong,
is in conflict or is not controverted."). An element of an offense "is defined as a "fact
necessary to constitute the crime." State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ^[11, 220 P.3d 1198
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2). When the trial
court denied Mr. McNearney the opportunity to argue the vacant house in this case was
not a "dwelling" as defined under Utah law and therefore Mr. McNearney was only
guilty of the lesser offense of burglary of a building, it relieved the State of its burden to
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Davis, 2007
UT App 13, 155 P.3d 909 (trial court committed prejudicial error by improperly
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instructing the jury that a bicycle path was a public park constituting a drug free zone, an
element of the offense, was established as a matter of law). The trial court's
determination was prejudicial.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments together "'give[] a criminal defendant the right
to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is
charged.'" Palmer, 2009 UT 55 at Tfl 1 (citation omitted); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 277 (1993) ("The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the
offense charged and must persuade the factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts
necessary to establish each of those elements."(citations omitted)). The most important
element of the Sixth Amendment is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge,
reach the requisite finding of 'guilty.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277. Also encompassed
within these amendments guaranteeing a defendant's right to a jury trial is the
requirement that a defendant's lesser included offense instruction must be given where
there is evidence to support the theory. See State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah
1988) (The requirement to give a lesser included offense instruction "when there is some
evidence which supports the theory asserted by defendant... is more than a procedural
nicety").
Although the State argues that "the trial court decided a pure question of law,"
when it denied Mr. McNearney the opportunity to argue his theory of the case to the jury
and failed to give the lesser included instruction requested, the State cannot escape that
the question of whether or not Mr. McNearney entered a "dwelling" remained an element
of the offense that required a jury determination of guilt. See Appellee Br. 19; Gaudin,
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515 U.S. at 511-14. As defense counsel argued below, the issue was a question of law
for the court to consider when determining the motion for directed verdict. R. 124:151.
However, when the trial court denied the motion and presented the issue to the jury it was
a question of fact for the jury's determination. R. 124:151. The United States Supreme
Court explained in Gaudin, that "the jury's constitutional responsibility is not merely to
determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion
of guilt or innocence." Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514. The Court noted that prior decisions
that "the judge must be permitted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist that the jury
follow his instruction" did not "undermine[] the historical and constitutionally guaranteed
right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence on every
issue, which includes application of the law to the facts." Id at 513-14.
Mr. McNearney was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included
offense of burglary of a building where there was evidence to support his theory of the
case that a vacant house that has never been occupied was not a "dwelling" as that
element is defined within the statute. See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah
1998); Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266 ("A defendant is entitled to have his legal theory of
the case placed before the jury if it would not be superfluous to do so because of an
absence of any evidence to support the theory."). Because neither the statute nor prior
case law has specifically defined a "dwelling" under the burglary statute as encompassing
a newly built vacant house that has never been inhabited, the trial court could not as a
matter of law determine that Mr. McNearney was prohibited from arguing his theory.
When the issue went to the jury, the question of whether Mr. McNearney entered a
4

"dwelling" was a question of fact, as are all elements of an offense, for the jury's
determination. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23.
It cannot be said that the trial court's error in denying Mr. McNearney the
opportunity to present his defense and its failure to give the lesser included instruction of
burglary of a building was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that no reasonable
juror would have found that the structure was not a "dwelling" and convicted Mr.
McNearney, instead, of third degree burglary. State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^|45, 55
P.3d 573 ("Where the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, we apply a
higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless we find the error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."). The trial court denied Mr. McNearney the right to argue
his theory of the case, that the structure he entered, did not meet the definition of a
"dwelling" as that term is defined by statute. R. 124:150-53. Yet, the State was allowed
to argue to the jury that the element of whether the structure Mr. McNearney entered was
a "dwelling" was met stating "We have a house. The purpose of the house is for people
to stay overnight. This wasn't an office building. This wasn't a warehouse. This wasn't
a garage. We have a dwelling." R. 124:171. By failing to allowing Mr. McNearney to
fully present his defense, the trial court allowed the question of whether a "dwelling" was
entered to go to the jury uncontested essentially removing a disputed issue of fact from
the jury's consideration and relieving the State of its burden to prove all the elements of
the offense. State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 212, ^28, 94 P.3d 308 ("An error is prejudicial if
it tends to 'mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or
erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law.'").
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In this case, by denying Mr. McNearney his right to argue to the jury the State
failed to prove an element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore at most
he was guilty of burglary of a building, a third degree felony, the trial court invaded the
province of the jury as the factfinder and violated Mr. McNearney's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to have the jury determine his guilt or innocence. The trial court's
denial of Mr. McNearney's constitutional right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and requires reversal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief,
Mr. McNearney respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for burglary of
a dwelling, a second degree felony and enter a conviction for burglary of a building, a
third degree felony. In the alternative, Appellant requests a new trial.
SUBMITTED this J ^ _ day of August, 2010.

DEBRA M. NELSON
TAWNI HANSEEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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